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I. COPYRIGHT REGIMES & AUTOMATED CONTENT MODERATION
PANEL
Moderated by Ron Lazebnik,1 the Copyright Regimes &
Automated Content Panel focused on the development of copyright
liability in different legal regimes and the difficulties in protecting
*
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1
Ron Lazebnik, https://www.fordham.edu/info/23156/ron_lazebnik/5479/full_bio
[https://perma.cc/3GDF-RYZE].

1

2

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXX:1

copyright-holders internationally due to the ease in which content
can cross international borders. Professor Lazebnik framed the
discussion around the contrast between Section 512 of the U.S.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”),2 which does not
require active monitoring for copyright infringements, and
Article 17 of the European Union’s (“E.U.”) Directive on Copyright
in the Digital Single Market,3 which does mandate active monitoring for copyright infringements.4 Panelists included Pamela
Samuelson, Director of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology
and Bacon–Kilkenny Visiting Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law5; Giuseppe Mazziotti, Ph.D., Assistant Professor
of Law at Trinity College Dublin6; Jennifer L. Pariser, Vice
President, Copyright & Legal Affairs, Motion Picture Association
of America7; Nora Choueiri, Senior Legal Counsel at Dailymotion8;
and Brian Carver, Copyright Counsel at Google LLC.9
Pamela Samuelson’s segment addressed the American copyright
regime with particular focus on the DMCA framework for Internet
Service Provider (“ISP”) liability. The DMCA implemented a
takedown regime codified in Section 512.10 The DMCA framework
2

Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2018).
Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April
2019 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market and Amending
Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/19/EC, 2019 O.J. (L 130) 92 [hereinafter Directive
2019/790], available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/790/oj [https://perma.cc/
3KXQ-AGN5].
4
Directive (EC) 2001/29 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May
2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the
Information Society, 2019 O.J. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter Directive 2001/29], available at
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32001L0029
[https://perma.cc/2APR-DPNA].
5
Pamela Samuelson, https://www.fordham.edu/info/23193/school_of_law_visiting_
faculty/10734/pamela_samuelson [https://perma.cc/G5TB-43DB]. Pamela Samuleson is
also the Richard M. Sherman Distinguished Professor of Law at Berkeley Law School.
6
Dr. Giuseppe Mazziotti, https://www.tcd.ie/research/profiles/?profile=mazziotg
[https://perma.cc/RFG6-X87Y].
7
Jennifer
L.
Pariser,
https://www.pli.edu/faculty/jennifer-l.-pariser-10585
[https://perma.cc/9ZAW-8G62].
8
Nora Choueiri, https://www.linkedin.com/in/nora-choueiri (last visited Nov. 20,
2019).
9
Brian Carver, https://www.linkedin.com/in/brianwcarver (last visited Nov. 20, 2019).
10
See generally Religious Tech. Center v. Netcom On-Line Comm’s, 907 F. Supp. 1361
(N.D. Cal. 1995). The DMCA was adopted in part based on this decision. See Emily M.
3
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allows individuals to submit takedown notices which prompt the
content provider to review for copyright infringement, and, if there
is a violation, take down the infringing work.11 The DMCA provides
content providers safe harbors from strict liability since they are not
required to monitor all content they post.12 Professor Samuelson
emphasized that the current system is not perfect, and the effects of
the American system should be evaluated and compared to the effects of the EU’s system. Samuelson summarized a study by UC
Berkley and Columbia University researchers called “Notice and
Takedown in Everyday Practice,”13 and explained how the
current copyright regimes have different influences on large and
small ISP companies. Samuelson concluded that the differences
between the DMCA and the E.U.’s Directive can be attributed to
these jurisdictions’ different political environments.
Giuseppe Mazziotti’s segment focused on the E.U. Copyright
Directive. Mazziotti described the European political climate
as very diverse, even within political groups. As a result, the
Directive took over two years to implement after it was originally
proposed and remained a point of controversy between the European
Parliament (representing citizens) and the E.U. Council (an intragovernmental body).14 Mazziotti stated that the goal of the Directive
is to support the content industries, and by doing so, Article 17
makes the platform directly liable for infringement issues.15 The
content industries are particularly important in European countries
because of their impact on politics. Mazziotti emphasized that the
Directive communicates that the European Parliament is satisfied
with how the world is changing regarding the internet and copyright
regimes; however, the Parliament is not satisfied with how traditional industries are being deprived of the power to monetize and
control their content. Mazziotti clarified that individual Member
States need to implement the Directive through their own laws.
Asp, Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: User Experience and User
Frustration, 103 Iowa L. Rev. 751, 759 (2018).
11
See Directive 2019/790, supra note 3.
12
See id.
13
See generally Jennifer M. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice
(U.C. Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2755628, 2017).
14
See Directive 2019/790, supra note 3.
15
See Directive 2001/29, supra note 4.
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Jennifer L. Pariser’s segment approached the U.S. notice-andtakedown regime from the content-holder’s perspective. Pariser
explained that this regime previously required copyright holders to
send a separate notice each time a content provider posted a video.16
If a single website posted copyrighted content in different places,
the copyright holder had to send a notice of removal for each direct
link. This caused a flood of notices and takedowns.17 Pariser
explained that the current regime is massively ineffective and
expensive for both the content-holders and media platforms. The
lack of a national regulation for combatting online piracy has prevented the system from becoming more effective. Pariser emphasized that due to the tidal wave of notices, content providers do not
have time to review individual files to determine if they have a valid
fair use defense. Pariser suggested that, at a minimum, the United
States should implement a national system that agrees on the format
of the notices. She opined that this would continue to make the process more efficient, though still not necessarily more effective.
Nora Choueiri applied the perspective of a platform owner
during her segment and focused on how Article 17 affects videohosting platforms such as her employer, Dailymotion.18 First,
Choueiri distinguished the DMCA from Article 17, explaining that
the DMCA has a safe harbor provision for online service providers.
The DMCA does not require monitoring, though does mandate use
of take-down provisions.19She contrasted this regime with France,
which adopted the E.U. Directive by passing its own copyright law
requiring content-hosting sites to obtain—or at least make a good
effort to obtain—authorization from every copyright holder whose
material they post. France’s law does not require content hosting
sites to monitor every video that is posted; yet the law instructs these

16
See Terrica Carrington, Twenty Years of the DMCA: Notice and Takedown in
Hindsight (Part I), COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE BLOG (Oct. 26, 2018), https://copyright
alliance.org/ca_post/dmca-notice-and-takedown/ [https://perma.cc/HCM7-FRF6].
17
BRUCE BOYDEN, CTR. FOR THE PROT. OF INTELLECTUAL PROP., THE FAILURE OF THE
DMCA NOTICE AND TAKEDOWN SYSTEM: A TWENTIETH CENTURY SOLUTION TO A TWENTYFIRST CENTURY PROBLEM 1 (2013), https://cpip.gmu.edu/2013/12/05/the-failure-of-thedmca-notice-and-takedown-system-2/ [https://perma.cc/7RB8-4KQ8].
18
DAILYMOTION, https://www.dailymotion.com/us [https://perma.cc/9USX-F4CY].
19
See Directive 2019/790, supra note 3.
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companies to use takedown notices.20 Choueiri commented that sites
like Dailymotion receive thousands of takedown notices every
month, though many of these notices are from people fraudulently
attempting to remove their competition. Choueiri explained that
Dailymotion has chosen to address copyright infringement beyond
what the law requires, such as by using upload filter technology that
scans all uploaded videos to detect infringement.21
Brian Carver discussed Google’s copyright-removal and rightsmanagement tools. He argued that while sophisticated matching
technologies can automate some aspect of this work, they
will always require human judgment and management to reach
appropriate outcomes. Carver explained that one of Google’s tools
for takedown requests is a trusted content removal program that can
be used by content owners who need to make takedown requests in
bulk.22 Carver also identified Google’s implementation of the
Copyright Match Tool23 which serves to identify nearly identical
re-uploads and present them to the copyright owner and the first
uploader in order to determine whether these two parties
collaborated in uploading content or if an infringement occurred.
Carver discussed how Google affords content owners the choice to
monetize the reposting of their content or else block their content
from being reposted instead of constantly sending out takedown
notices. Carver argued that one of Google’s most difficult copyright
challenges is the difficulty in distinguishing what is actually
unauthorized content.

20

See Directive 2001/29, supra note 4.
Dailymotion Announces Full Implementation of INA Technology for Detection of Copyrighted Video, BUSINESSWIRE (Feb. 25, 2008, 8:45 AM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20080225005530/en/Dailymotion-Announces-Full-Implementation-INA-Technology-Detection [https://perma.cc/BB84-V4A2].
22
See Trusted Copyright Removal Program Guidelines, GOOGLE LEGAL HELP,
https://support.google.com/legal/answer/7421674?product=websearch [https://perma.cc/
89FX-GQSA]. To illustrate this point, Carver pointed to Google’s 2018 Transparency
Report, which showed that Google removed 700 million URLs that year, 75 percent of
which never made it to the search index in the first place. See Transparency Report,
GOOGLE, https://transparencyreport.google.com/?hl=en [https://perma.cc/74JR-YQH9].
23
See Copyright Match Tool, YOUTUBE HELP, https://support.google.com/youtube/
answer/7648743?hl=en [https://perma.cc/N3BZ-4C76].
21
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II. HUMAN DIGNITY, AGENCY & ALGORITHMIC BIAS PANEL
Moderated by Andrew Selbst,24 the Human Dignity, Agency &
Algorithmic Bias Panel discussed the manifestations and impact of
algorithmic bias in social media content moderation. The Panel
explored various hot button topics in our society ranging from housing to free speech while sharing perceptive insight on ways to deal
with algorithmic bias.
The Panel included Ana-Andreea Stoica, Ph.D Candidate of
Computer Science at Columbia University25; Diane L. Houk, Of
Counsel at Emery Celli Brinkerhoff & Abady LLP26; Rebecca
Crootof, Assistant Professor of Law at University Richmond School
of Law27; and Charlton D. McIlwain, Professor of Media, Culture
and Communication at New York University.28
Ana-Andreea Stoica outlined the dangers of algorithmic bias and
offered possible solutions to mitigate them. She first identified two
interrelated sources of algorithmic bias: the first being algorithms
that reflect the pre-existing human biases and the second being data
sets themselves that the algorithms process. Although algorithms
cannot inherently possess a discriminatory intent, they can still have
a discriminatory impact due to either the implicit or explicit biases
of their human programmers. These biases inadvertently added
through the necessity of human programmers amplify various types
of biases in our society.29

24

Andrew Selbst, https://datasociety.net/people/selbst-andrew/ [https://perma.cc/
4KMT-9PCK]. Andrew Selbst is a Postdoctoral Scholar at the Data & Society Research
Institute.
25
Ana-Andreea Sotica, http://www.columbia.edu/~as5001/ [https://perma.cc/3ECLYCPW].
26
Daine
L.
Houk,
https://www.ecbalaw.com/our-people/diane-l-houk/
[https://perma.cc/4Q2C-MEH5].
27
Rebecca Crootof, https://law.richmond.edu/faculty/rcrootof/ [https://perma.cc/MZQ9
-RD7K].
28
Charlton
D.
McIlwain,
https://steinhardt.nyu.edu/people/charlton-mcilwain
[https://perma.cc/A8N6-CXBT].
29
Sara Hajian, Francesco Bonchi & Carlos Castillo, Algorithmic Bias: From
Discrimination Discovery to Fairness-Aware Data Mining at the 22nd ACM SIGKDD
International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (Aug. 2016),
https://www.isi.it/wp_blobs/publication/document/tut026.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
P2HA-MNY8].
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Intuition might suggest that designing a fair algorithm is a cure.
Yet, Stoica pointed out that people have different notions of fairness
and, more importantly, what is fair in one algorithm might not be
fair in another. Accordingly, she proposed a case-by-case approach
to evaluate potential algorithmic biases. This approach weeds out
bias by identifying biases inherent in data and properly contextualizing them. Contextualization, Stoica noted, depends on the purpose
of an algorithm. Furthermore, Stoica noted that our society needs to
demand more transparency from content moderators because their
decisions can have a long-term influence on real-life human interactions. Otherwise, content moderation ends up stoking polarization
through people believing their voices are arbitrarily and thus unfairly excluded from online media platforms.
Diane L. Houk identified three layers of algorithmic bias and
went on to outline how each layer has been (and will be) legally
addressed. Houk used the Facebook litigation as her exemplar
throughout her presentation; she represented the National Fair Housing Alliance in a lawsuit against Facebook for its “racial affinity”
algorithmic function that allegedly helps housing advertisers to
reach their preferred racial population.30
Houk explained that in the first layer of algorithmic bias, the
most overt layer, the function would forthrightly ask which races the
advertisers want to target, with whiteness as the baseline setting.31
However, Houk argued that Facebook took advantage of the second
layer of bias, inferential discrimination, in violation of the Federal
Housing Act.32 As an example, Houk pointed to the advertisers’
ability to select zip codes, which, in practice, act as a proxy for race.
30

Complaint, Nat’l Fair Hous. All. v. Facebook, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 18 Civ.
2689), https://nationalfairhousing.org/facebook-complaint/ [https://perma.cc/Z3KSYUJ5]. The lawsuit settled in March 2019. See Press Release, National Fair Housing
Alliance, Fair Housing Groups Settle with Facebook: Transforms Facebook’s Ad Platform
Impacting Millions of Users (March 18, 2019), https://nationalfairhousing.org/
2019/03/18/national-fair-housing-alliance-settles-lawsuit-with-facebook-transformsfacebooks-ad-platform-impacting-millions-of-users/ [https://perma.cc/B96Y-E9E9].
31
Alex Hern, Facebook’s ‘Ethnic Affinity’ Advertising Sparks Concerns of Racial
Profiling, GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2016, 8:42 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2016/mar/22/facebooks-ethnic-affinity-advertising-concerns-racial-profiling
[https://perma.cc/N3Z5-RETG].
32
The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1968).
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Facebook subsequently adjusted its policy by imposing more restrictions on ad-targeting in the housing and employment markets to
avoid civil rights violations.33
The third layer of algorithmic bias is more insidious, and concerns the delivery of the advertisement. Under the current “lookalike
audiences” algorithm, if someone clicks on an advertisement, the
advertisement will be exposed to a similar demographic.34 Houk
argued that it is unclear as to whether the U.S. Housing and Urban
Development (“HUD”) Department will impose restrictions on this
third layer based on disparate impact. Houk concluded by emphasizing that policymakers, in addition to algorithm engineers, should
be heavily involved in addressing the various layers of algorithmic
bias that intersect with civil right issues.
As a corollary to the algorithmic bias presented on platforms,
Dr. Rebecca Crootof argued that despite the benefits of using
artificial intelligence (“AI”) in the judicial process, such use would
ultimately cause significant errors in case judgments as a result of
algorithmic biases on a wide scale. Crootof provided examples for
current successful use of AI in the judicial system, such as assisting
citizens in their disputes of parking tickets,35 and providing free
automated legal chat services.36 Additionally, Crootof cited to an
Estonia as an example of a country that resolves minor contract disputes through AI.37

33

Colin Lecher, Facebook Drops Targeting Options for Housing, Job, and Credit Ads
After Controversy, VERGE (Mar. 19, 2019, 2:44 PM), https://www.theverge.com/
2019/3/19/18273018/facebook-housing-ads-jobs-discrimination-settlement
[https://perma.cc/8HCQ-4HET].
34
About Lookalike Audiences, FACEBOOK FOR BUSINESS https://www.facebook.com/
business/help/164749007013531?id=401668390442328 [https://perma.cc/M4U4-3EPG].
35
Dispute Any Parking Ticket in Any City, DONOTPAY https://donotpay.com/
learn/dispute-parking-ticket-and-win/ [https://perma.cc/F2EV-R6YU].
36
Tom Martin, How a Small Practice Attorney Used Automation to Build Profits and
Reclaim Time, ARAG LEGAL, https://www.araglegal.com/attorneys/learning-center/
topics/practice-management-technology/how-to-automate-administrative-tasks-for-yourfirm [https://perma.cc/QZ77-H6RN].
37
Eric Niller, Can AI Be a Fair Judge in Court? Estonia Thinks So, WIRED
(Mar. 25, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/can-ai-be-fair-judge-courtestonia-thinks-so/ [https://perma.cc/B2HU-WHME].
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Crootof noted that AI initially appears attractive because judges
as human arbiters are inconsistent. There is also a limited supply of
judges that can each hear a limited number of cases. Crootof warned
that while AI may provide cheap and quick access to justice, these
systems operate by extracting rules from clear patterns in narrow
circumstances and mechanically applying them. Crootof argued that
this inflexibility is not ideal for judicial judgments that involve considerations of either extenuating circumstances or changing social
norms. Crootof cited a recent study that translated speeding rules
into judgments. One program was based on the letter of the law and
the other on the intent of the law.38 When evaluating the same
scenario, the former issued an average of 498 tickets and the other
averaged 1.5 tickets.39 Crootof argued that AI cannot overcome
algorithmic bias because the data it uses already includes bias. This
problem is magnified by what otherwise seems to be AI’s greatest
appeal: scaling. Ultimately, she concluded that judges are necessary,
because unlike AI, they can curb the worst excesses of human behavior by engaging in nuanced rule application and value-balancing.
Dr. Charlton McIlwain explored the tension between the
potential for algorithmic systems to solve problems and the racial
logic that underlies the coding that creates algorithmic bias. He
quoted former President Lyndon B. Johnson,40 author W.E.B.
DuBois,41 and former NAACP director Roy Wilkins42 to argue that
when a social group is called a problem, it is then associated with
everything that describes itself as a solution. AI creates solutions
in search of problems and race is an attractive one because it
has been historically identified and continually persists. McIlwain
argued that algorithmic bias today is simply another code for

38

See generally Lisa Shay, Woodrow Hartzog, John Nelson, & Gregory Conti, Do
Robots Dream of Electric Laws? An Experiment in the Law as Algorithm, 274, in ROBOT
LAW (Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 1st ed. 2016).
39
See id. at 289.
40
Lyndon B. Johnson, President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Special Message to the Congress:
The American Promise (Mar. 15, 1965), available at http://americanradioworks
.publicradio.org/features/prestapes/lbj_congress.html [https://perma.cc/NX7M-E25H].
41
See generally W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (1903).
42
See generally Roy Wilkins, Computerize the Race Problem?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11,
1967.
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racism because the systems are written with a new “Jim Code.”43
Algorithmic bias, moreover, attaches itself to other social groups
that are still considered “problems,” such as the immigrants, poor,
homeless, incarcerated, refugees, and unemployed. McIlwain closed
by saying that if we are to fix, address, or even frame the problem
of race within artificial intelligence, then we must examine its
causes and effects within society and not be led astray into thinking
that fixing the algorithms will fix the problems. The solution must
focus on fixing our conceptions of what are the actual problems in
society and only then can we collect data that empowers our
algorithms differently.
III. KEYNOTE SPEECH
Kate Klonick, Assistant Professor at St. John’s University
School of Law and an Affiliate Fellow at Yale Law School’s
Information Society Project,44 argued that several recent events
signify new threats to speech in the age of the internet. Klonick
began by chronicling several recent events which served to characterize the current state of free speech and platform governance. The
Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) issued two rulings
which effectively grant EU Member States the power to issue global
injunctions on defamatory speech.45 Additionally, Facebook
announced that politicians’ speech will not be removed even if it
violates their established community standards.46 Klonick argued
that these events highlight two problems: (1) nation states are
imposing their speech policies on the rest of the world, and
(2) politicians’ speech is being privileged over political discourse.

43

See generally RUBA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY: ABOLITIONIST TOOLS FOR

THE NEW JIM CODE (2019).
44
Kate Klonick, https://www.stjohns.edu/law/faculty/kate-klonick [https://perma.cc/
GP9A-XJ2D].
45
See COMM’N NATIONALE DE L’INFORMATIQUE ET DES LIBERTÉS, RIGHT TO BE
FORGOTTEN: THE CJEU RULED ON THE ISSUE, (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.cnil.fr/en/
right-be-forgotten-cjue-ruled-issue [https://perma.cc/79Q9-EQ93]; see also Case C-18/18,
Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 2019 E.C.R. 821.
46
See Nick Clegg, Facebook, Elections and Political Speech, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM
(Sept. 24, 2019), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/09/elections-and-political-speech/
?mod=article_inline [https://perma.cc/X2JS-DF46].
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Klonick emphasized that the CJEU rulings provide the EU with
the power of extraterritorial jurisdiction.47 While the imposition of
Western democratic values on powerful, private platforms may
seem like a good idea at first glance, Klonick stressed that there
is one major drawback—there is no democratic accountability
mechanism in place for a global user either through a platform or
through any one nation state. For example, a user in Thailand has no
more ability to exercise a democratic vote in the EU than they do
with a private platform such as Facebook. Thus, Klonick argues, the
European Union’s extraterritorial imposition of its law on Facebook
provides no more democratic legitimacy to global users than if
Facebook were entirely self-governed. Klonick calls this problem
“the digital democracy deficit.”
Klonick also argued that Facebook’s new policy, which exempts
politicians’ speech from its community standards,48 poses a threat to
the balance of political discourse. Under Facebook’s new policy, a
political figure can post a campaign advertisement onto Facebook
replete with falsehoods onto Facebook and even if the advertisement
is proven untrue, Facebook will not remove it.49 Klonick conceded
that the policy serves to protect political speech, which is widely
accepted as a core principle of the First Amendment.50 Klonick
also acknowledged that some might argue that all political figures’
speech should be protected because doing so promotes democratic
values and political discourse. Klonick, however, posited that
there are three problems with that argument: (1) private online platforms can accelerate and amplify dangerous speech, (2) privileging
political speech reinforces historical power structures, and (3) the
CJEU rulings combined with the new Facebook policy constitute a

47

Extraterritorial jurisdiction is the legal ability of a government to exercise authority
beyond its normal boundaries. See generally Anthony J. Colangelo, What Is
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1303 (2014).
48
See Casey Newton, Facebook’s Decision to Allow Lies in Political Ads Is Coming
Back to Haunt It, VERGE (Oct. 15, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/
interface/2019/10/15/20913906/facebook-political-ads-lies-zuckerberg-warren-profits
[https://perma.cc/V863-EUV3].
49
See id.
50
See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 329 (2010) (“Political speech . . . is central
to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”).
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new threat in the form of politicians’ ability to promote misinformation and silence critics.
Klonick went on to argue that, before the internet, the most
prominent threats to citizens’ free speech and privacy rights came
from the government. These threats include censorship from the
state, warrantless searches of the home or person, and prior restraints
on the press. Klonick referred to this as a dyadic model of speech
governance consisting of citizens on one side and government on
the other.51 The advent of the internet, however, seemed to usher in
a new era in which national borders, governments, and their speech
laws were increasingly obsolete. Klonick suggested that the
emergence of private online platforms morphed the dyadic model
into a triadic model of speech governance which allows for citizens
to use online platforms to route around government censorship.52
Private online platforms may have created a third realm, but Klonick
argues that this has not diminished the relevance or power of nation
states to govern speech. Instead, Klonick believes that nation states
have capitalized on the rise of private online platforms by using the
internet to seize power.
Klonick then chronicled Facebook’s creation of an independent
content Oversight Board.53 In November 2018, Mark Zuckerberg
announced that Facebook was in the process of launching the
Oversight Board.54 In January 2019, Facebook began a six-month
global consultancy, which included talking to over 2000 people in
88 different countries and conducting six workshops.55 Finally, in
51
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September 2019, Facebook announced the results of that campaign
and how they planned to use that information going forward.56
Klonick described the planned structure of the Board. Facebook
will appoint two co-chairs who will, with Facebook’s help, pick nine
additional members of the Board.57 When the Board reaches eleven
members it will start hearing cases.58 The Board will hear cases
regarding the censorship of “simple objects” such as photos, videos,
and text on appeal from the user whose content was censored.59
The decision that the Board reaches, whether censorship is appropriate or not, is binding on Facebook.60 The Board can also issue
non-binding policy suggestions—Facebook must publicly respond
to whether or not they choose to adopt these suggestions.61 Klonick
believes that Facebook’s good faith effort to cede some power back
to their user base is a small step in the right direction.
IV. PLATFORM GOVERNANCE PANEL
Moderated by Professor Abner S. Greene,62 the Platform
Governance Panel focused on different governance models for
regulating content on social media platforms. Panelists included Zoe
Mentel Darmé, Manager, Global Affairs and Governance at
Facebook63; Robert J. deBrauwere, Partner and Co-Chair, Digital
Media Group at Pryor Cashman LLP64; Evelyn Douek, S.J.D.
Candidate at Harvard Law School and Affiliate at the Berkman
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Klein Center for Internet Society65; and Nadine Strossen, John
Marshall Harlan II Professor of Law at New York Law School.66
Zoe Mentel Darmé’s segment focused on describing the content
Oversight Board being created by Facebook. The Board is an
independent entity funded by a trust set up by Facebook and will
have the power to review and render judgement on difficult content
review cases.67 It will consist of eleven to forty members and have
a balanced gender and geographical representation, as well as a
diversity of disciplines and expertise.68 Both Facebook and its users
will be able to refer content to the Board.69 Once the Board has made
a determination on content, Facebook will be bound by it.70 Darmé
explained that this model was created in response to criticism of
Facebook’s current content review policies and Facebook’s own
feeling that input from external sources on tough content decisions
is valuable. She emphasized that this was not a replacement for
government action and that the Board would not be reviewing cases
about content that is already considered unlawful.
Robert J. deBrauwere’s segment focused on explaining the
historical context and evolution of the normative principles of
platform governance. He argued that while the First Amendment
does not apply to privately-owned social media companies, laws still
shape platform governance. He noted that the operational principles
of social media platforms are clearly shaped and dictated by
the DMCA.71 With the passage of this act, Congress shifted the
burden on copyright owners to notify online service providers when
infringing content is published on the site.72 In Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe, Inc., the court likened CompuServe to a distributor
rather than a publisher and held that the companies could not be held
65
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liable for content published on its platform.73 However, in Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services. Co., the court held that because
Prodigy curated its content it acted as an editor and could be held
liable for content on its site.74 This decision prompted Section 230
of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which states that
online platforms cannot be held liable for content posted by others
on their platforms.75 DeBrauwere argued that companies need to
look at context for their governance model to make sure they have
created an environment that best suits the interests of the company.
In her segment, Evelyn Douek took a broad view of governance
across social media platforms. She argued that content moderation
systems have been undergoing a crisis of legitimacy since 2016 and
that there are concerns about the consequences of what social media
deems to be hate speech, as well as what fake news is allowed
online. She further argued that while leaving these decisions to
private companies is problematic, government regulation of speech
has the potential to invade private rights. Douek stated that due to
public pressure, many social media platforms are responding with
various experiments to moderate content on their own platforms.76
Douek expressed skepticism about Facebook’s model, stating that it
would not settle disputes about the limits of free speech, would not
create global norms, and that there was very little due process.
However, she also argued that the Oversight Board could create an
independent check on Facebook and could provide a space for
public reasoning, transparency, and contestation around the rules on
free speech.
Nadine Strossen’s segment argued for platform oversight via
corporate governance and individual choice as opposed to
government regulation. Strossen began by giving a brief history of
regulating speech online. The Communications Decency Act was
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passed due to public fears in the early years of the internet, particularly fears about child pornography.77 In response, the ACLU
formed a task force to address civil liberties online.78 Later, the
Supreme Court agreed with the ACLU position and ruled that the
free speech principles, which apply to print media, should apply
online.79 Strossen argued that individual users should be able
to determine what they would and would not like to see. She argued
that smaller platforms should have autonomy but the largest networks, such as Facebook, should voluntarily comply with the
standards set out in Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. To protect against the negative impacts of certain
types of online media, Strossen advocated for vigorous media
literacy education, starting from a young age.
Videos of the entire Symposium can be found on the Fordham
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal’s website
here: http://www.fordhamiplj.org/2019/10/10/the-27th-annual-ipljsymposium-platform-society-copyright-free-speech-and-sharingon-social-media-platforms-friday-october-4-2019/.
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